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Abstract
Spillovers resulting from fiscal and monetary policy are compared and analysed in small
static, small dynamic and large dynamic multi-country models. To compare the size of the
spillovers, we consider simulations in which GDP for a certain number of years is held one
percent above base in the country where the shock originates. The results indicate that
spillovers are large in size. An important transmission mechanism in the contribution to
foreign GDP is found to be the foreign real interest rate, contributions to foreign GDP
generated through trade are found to be small. In empirical models with endogenous
exchange and interest rates, it was found that under floating exchange rate regimes
spillovers are much smaller than under pegged exchange rate regimes. Furthermore, we note
 .that under floating exchange rate regimes, spillovers seem to be larger in small dynamic
models than in large empirical models. Q 1998 Elsevier Science B.V.
JEL Classifications: E62; F41; C52
Keywords: Multi-country model; International spillovers; Evaluation and simulation
1. Introduction
Due to the increasing integration process in capital, financial and product
markets economic interaction across countries is becoming more important. Fiscal
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or monetary policy in one country will in general have a non-negligible effect on
the economies of neighbour-countries. These external effects called spillovers can
be large, in particular when linkages between countries are strong. Therefore in
theoretical and empirical economics there is a growing interest in the measure,
sign and size of spillovers.
Theoretical work analysing international spillovers mainly refers to the work of
 .  .Mundell 1963 and Fleming 1962 and to modified versions of their model, see
 .  .e.g. McKibbin and Sachs 1991 and Krugman 1995 . The standard static, symmet-
ric, two-country Mundell-Fleming model assumes complete capital mobility, flexi-
ble exchange rates, and sticky wages and prices. In this model an expanding fiscal
policy originating in the home country raises foreign GDP whereas an expanding
home monetary policy lowers foreign GDP. In general however, the sign and size
of spillovers crucially depends upon the model assumptions.
Another branch of research involves studies with empirical multi-country mod-
els. Multi-country models seem to be very suitable for analyzing transmission
mechanisms across countries. Since different models normally provide different
spillover responses it seems that the first task is to identify these differences. The
next step may then be to evaluate these different responses and to use this
knowledge when building models in the future. An important initiating multi-coun-
try comparison project was sponsored by the Brookings Institution, see Bryant et
 .al. 1988 .
Some comparative research concerning spillovers has been undertaken by Helli-
 .  .  .well and Padmore 1985 ; Frankel 1988 ; Whitley 1992b . They apply the same
type of shock-analyses on different multi-country models and the responses of the
different models are compared and analysed. For example, they compare the
responses of GDP in foreign countries to a fiscal or monetary shock originating in
a domestic country.
 .For fiscal shock experiments, Helliwell and Padmore 1985 show the importance
of considering the exchange rate and monetary linkages jointly. For a monetary
shock the type of exchange rate regime is important. A flexible exchange rate
increases the domestic income and price effects of domestic monetary policy while
reducing the foreign effects. Frankel’s study considers a permanent government
expenditure shock of one percent of GDP and a permanent increase in the money
stock of four percent. In the short run he finds that there is less ambiguity across
models about the effect of a fiscal expansion than of a monetary expansion. A
fiscal expansion raises foreign GDP in the second year of the simulation whereas
the negative Mundell-Fleming effect of domestic monetary expansion on foreign
GDP is often not present in the models. The explanation of a positive foreign GDP
response is that the appreciation of the foreign currency has one or more of the
following four expansionary effects: an increase in the real money supply or real
wealth or a decrease in wages or imported input costs.
 .Whitley 1992a considers fiscal policy shocks originating in several European
economies and a fiscal policy shock originating in the US, with fixed real interest
rates. The fiscal expansion in a European country results only in very small
spillover effects in other EU-economies, for most models. On the other hand, for a
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US fiscal expansion Whitley reports European GDP figures of 10]25% of the US
GDP-response. These outcomes cannot easily be compared with the previous two
studies since the experimental conditions were different, incorporating fixed as-
 .sumptions about the exchange rate regime and nominal or real interest rates and
so closing off important channels. Since the exchange rate is a key element in these
 .comparison projects, Whitley 1992a incorporated endogenous exchange-rate be-
haviour in the simulations. Small European spillovers were again found, although it
is also shown that the sign of various spillovers are sensitive to the assumed
monetary policy regime.
These moderate spillovers obtained with empirical macromodels are in some
contrast to the common belief that interdependencies among countries, especially
in integrating Europe, are large. Comparisons of spillovers are however difficult to
interpret. Suppose for example that the same monetary shock induces in the first
year in model A a home GDP-response of 1% above base and in model B a home
GDP-response of 0.3% above base, but both models produce the same GDP-spil-
lover effect of, let’s say, 0.2% above base in the foreign country. Are now spillover
effects large in model A and B or only in model A or in none of the two models?
This interpretation problem enhances over time and since comparisons across
models are likely to be contaminated by different domestic responses we will
introduce a standardization concept in this paper.
The definition normally used for a spillo¨er is the extent to which a foreign
variable changes due to fiscal policy, monetary policy or another exogenous shock
in the domestic country. A GDP-spillover is thus the change in foreign GDP that
has been spilled over from the domestic country, due to some exogenous domestic
shock.
The main aim of this paper is to compare the spillover-effects with the domestic
effects that are both caused by some domestic shock, first in a static model, then in
a dynamic model and finally in a large calibrated and a large estimated multi-coun-
try model. Our comparative analyses are always undertaken with fully operating
models so that the simulation exercises always exploit all the interdependencies
built into the model. Whenever possible, the spillover is disentangled into its major
components. To make some judgement about the size of the spillover we introduce
the following standardization of a GDP-spillover.
The standardization concerns the foreign GDP-response expressed as a percent-
age of the domestic GDP-response, where the domestic shock is constructed such
 .that domestic GDP is of a constant but nonzero magnitude for a certain number
of years.
The measure used in previous mentioned studies was that foreign GDP-spil-
lovers were always expressed as a percentage of a fluctuating domestic GDP
response. Clearly, the interpretation of this measure becomes blurred if domestic
GDP is close to zero. This problem does occur often in practice since after a
permanent fiscal or monetary shock most multi-country models show rather fast
crowding out responses. Therefore, we adopt the approach to fix the domestic
 .GDP-response instead of fixing the domestic shock . It also conforms more closely
to popular usage. For instance, ‘the improvement in Germany’s growth will
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stimulate growth in the Netherlands’ occurs more often than comparisons such as
‘the increase in German government expenditure will boost Dutch growth’. Differ-
ent policy instruments may be used to achieve such a constant GDP-response, and
the calculation of the required instrument setting in typical British model-handling
 .software is referred to as a a Type II fix, see e.g. Wallis et al. 1985 .
It should be kept in mind that any standardization of measuring spillovers in
macromodels has drawbacks since comparisons may be contaminated by different
domestic responses. A way out could be to exogenize home GDP and increase it
permanently by, for example, one percent. However, in the absence of a specifica-
tion of the mechanism whereby the stimulus is achieved, its interpretation is almost
impossible and important second-round effects may be excluded see Andrews et
 . .al. 1985 on the distinction between ‘what-if’ and ‘if-only’ experiments .
The outline of this paper is as follows. In Section 2 the transmission channels
through which foreign GDP is affected by fiscal and monetary policy is analyzed by
means of a static Mundell-Fleming model. In Section 3 the same type of analysis is
extended to four dynamic versions of the Mundell-Fleming model adapted from
 .Ghosh and Masson 1994 . In Section 4 three large multi-country models are used
to evaluate the spillovers from US fiscal and monetary policy to Germany, the
United Kingdom and France and, similarly, the effects of German policy to the US,
the United Kingdom, and France. The models under investigation are the MSG2-
  ..model see McKibbin and Sachs 1991 , MULTIMOD of the IMF and NiGEM of
 .  .the National Institute} London , as recently studied by Mitchell et al. 1997 .
Section 5 concludes.
2. Modified static versions of the Mundell-Fleming model
Most multi-country models have the Mundell-Fleming framework as their basic
foundation. Across the economies that are modelled in detail, specifications often
have a broad similarity with the values of key coefficients sometimes being set
 .equal across countries MSG2 and MULTIMOD . To fix ideas we first consider the
spillover effects from fiscal and monetary policy in a standard two-country
Mundell-Fleming model. Table 1 presents a modified static version that is similar
 .  .to the one presented by McKibbin and Sachs 1991 see their Table 2-1 , the only
difference being that we deviate from the symmetric country assumption and allow
the parameters of the domestic and foreign country to take different values. An
 .extensive and comprehensive explanation of the symmetric model is given by
McKibbin and Sachs. We repeat only the basics here. The two economies are a
 . domestic country represented without asterisks and a foreign country repre-
.sented with asterisks , described by 12 equations in Table 1.
 .  .Eq. 1-1 is the standard LM curve for the domestic country. Eq. 1-2 describes
 .real aggregate demand in semi-reduced form as a function of the real exchange
  ..rate described in Eq. 1-6 , the nominal interest rate, foreign GDP, government
 .expenditure and taxes. Eq. 1-3 represents the domestic price level as a markup
over wages and demand. In order to keep analyses tractable, nominal wages in Eq.
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Table 1
A modified version of a static two-country Mundell-Fleming model
 .m y p s f q y b i 1-11 1
U U U U U .m y p s f q y b i 1-12 2
U  .q s d l y s i q g q q m g y n t 1-21 1 1 1 1
U U U U U .q s yd l y s i q g q q m g y n t 1-22 2 2 2 2
 .p s w q u q 1-31
U U U U .p s w q u q 1-32
c  .w s z p 1-41
U U Uc  .w s z p 1-42
Uc ( )( )  .p s a p q 1 y a e q p 1-51 1
U U Uc ( )( )  .p s a p q 1 y a ye q p 1-52 2
U  .l s e q p y p 1-6
U  .i s i 1-7
Notes: Variables without an asterisk are domestic country variables, variables with an asterisk are
foreign country variables. All variables, except i, are in logarithmic form. Parameters are assumed to be
positive, with 0 - g ,g ,a ,a - 1. Symmetry holds if f s f , b s b , d s d , s s s , g s g ,1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2
n s n , u s u , z s z , a s a .1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2
Definitions of endogenous variables:
q s real GDP
i s level of nominal interest rate
e s exchange rate defined as the price in domestic currency of a unit of foreign currency
l s real exchange rate
p s price level
pc s consumer price level
w s nominal wage
Definitions of exogenous variables:
m s nominal money balances
g s real government expenditure
t s real taxes.
 .  .1-4 are assumed to be either fixed z s z s 0 or fully indexed to the consumer1 2
 .  .price level z s z s 1 . Eq. 1-5 represents the consumer price level as a1 2
weighted average of the price of domestically produced goods and the price of
 .imported goods. Finally, Eq. 1-7 represents the perfect capital mobility condition.
Only short-run effects appear in the model, which makes it easy to obtain
analytical solutions for shock experiments. To critically assess the model with
respect to GDP-spillovers we consider two shocks. The first shock is a fiscal
expenditure shock in the home country such that home GDP raises by 1. The
second shock is a monetary shock in the home country such that home GDP raises
by 1. In this static model the value 1 is not particularly important as any size of
shock can be performed to report the statistic DqUrD q, where D denotes absolute
 .deviation from the base simulation since all variables are in logarithms . However,
in subsequent sections where dynamic models are considered this choice is crucial.
Four wage regimes and three exchange rate regimes are distinguished, mainly as
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Table 2
Decomposition of foreign output after a fiscal policy shock
U UDq rDq DlrDq D i rDq
Fixed wages and prices in both countries
 .b f f b g y f s y b f f2 1 2 1 2 1 2 2 1 1 .1A
b f b d f b1 2 1 2 2 1
b g g f2 2 2 2 .2A 0
b q f s b q f s2 2 2 2 2 2
b g y f s f1 2 1 2 1 .3A 0
b b1 1
Fixed wages and prices in the home country and foreign indexation
 . .  .1 y a b g y f s u b g y f s f2 1 2 1 2 2 1 2 1 2 1 .1B
 .  .b 1 y a q d u b 1 y a q d u b1 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 1
 .  . .1 y a b g b g u g 1 y a f q u2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 .2B
 . .  .  . .  .  . .  .1 y a b q f s q u b d q s 1 y a b q f s q u b d q s 1 y a b q f s q u b d q s2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
 . .  .1 y a b g y f s u b g y f s f2 1 2 1 2 2 1 2 1 2 1 .3B
 .  .b 1 y a q d u b 1 y a q d u b1 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 1
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Home indexation and fixed wages and prices in the foreign country
 . .  . .b 1 y a g q d u u f 1 y a g q d u2 1 2 2 1 1 2 1 2 2 1 .1C y
 . .  . .1 y a b q f s 1 y a 1 y a b q f s1 2 2 2 1 1 2 2 2
 . .  . .b 1 y a g q d u u f 1 y a g q d u2 1 2 2 1 1 2 1 2 2 1 .2C , y
 . .  . .1 y a b q f s 1 y a 1 y a b q f s1 2 2 2 1 1 2 2 2
 . .  .  .1 y a b g y f s q b d y s u u 1 y a f y u1 1 2 1 2 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 .3C y
 .  .1 y a b 1 y a 1 y a b1 1 1 1 1
Home and foreign indexation
 .  .  .1 y a u u 1 y a q d u u q 1 y a g u2 1 1 2 2 2 1 1 2 2 .1D y y
 .  .1 y a u 1 y a 1 y a s u1 2 1 1 2 2
 .  .  .1 y a u u 1 y a q d u u q 1 y a g u2 1 1 2 2 2 1 1 2 2 .2D y y
 .  .1 y a u 1 y a 1 y a s u1 2 1 1 2 2
 .  .  .1 y a u u 1 y a q d u u q 1 y a g u2 1 1 2 2 2 1 1 2 2 .3D y y
 .  .1 y a u 1 y a 1 y a s u1 2 1 1 2 2
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 .in McKibbin and Sachs 1991 . This enables us to compare the foreign GDP-re-
sponses across the different regimes. The wage regimes are:
 .v A Fixed wages and prices in both economies: z s z s u s u s 0;1 2 1 2
 .v B Fixed wages and prices in the home country, full indexation to consumer
prices in the foreign country: z s u s 0, z s 1;1 1 2
 .v C Full indexation to consumer prices in the home country, fixed wages and
prices in the foreign country: z s 1, z s u s 0;1 2 2
 .v D Home and foreign indexation to consumer prices: z s z s 1.1 2
The exchange rate regimes are:
 .v 1 A floating exchange rate;
 .v 2 A fixed exchange rate, where the home country is pegging the rate;
 .v 3 A fixed exchange rate, where the foreign country is pegging the rate.
 .  .A country that is pegging the nominal exchange rate e s 0 is assumed to
choose its level of money accordingly.
Tables 2 and 4 present the decomposition of a foreign GDP-response to a fiscal
policy shock and a monetary shock in the home country, respectively. The different
 .  .  .  .exchange rate and wage regimes are denoted 1 ] 3 and A ] D , as above. Dq
and DqU represent home and foreign GDP deviation from the base simulation,
respectively. Dl and D iU are similar notations for the real exchange rate and the
nominal interest rate.
The shocks are constructed such that Dq s 1 by which the decomposition of
foreign GDP is
U U  .Dq s yd Dl y s D i q g 12 2 2
The exchange rate, nominal interest rate and g thus completely determine foreign2
GDP. Government expenditure, gU , and fiscal expenditure, tU , do not appear as
they are exogenous.
The results partly correspond with the results presented by McKibbin and Sachs
 .1991 in their Table 2-2. A main difference is that McKibbin and Sachs only report
whether the response is positive, negative or undetermined. Here, instead, the
 .multipliers of the full analytical solutions obtained with Mathematica are shown.
This enables us to trace which coefficients determine the sign of the responses and
so offers greater insight.
2.1. Fiscal policy shock
A government expenditure shock directly raises home GDP, which through the
money demand equation affects interest rates positively. This always holds in all
 .  .regimes, except 3C where u - 1 y a f also needs to be satisfied. An increase1 1 1
in interest rates affects home and foreign GDP negatively through aggregate
  .  U ..   .  U ..demand Eqs. 1-2 , 1-2 , but positively through money demand Eqs. 1-1 , 1-1 .
It is the trade off between these two effects, and in particular the sign and size of
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b g y f s , which determines the ultimate sign on the foreign GDP response1 2 1 2
  . .see column 1 in Table 2 . In some cases the real exchange rate, see column 2,
has appreciated from the point of view of the home country. Foreign goods thus
become cheaper relative to home goods. How this actually feeds through to foreign
GDP depends crucially on the sign and size of the other components in the foreign
aggregate demand equation. The table shows that if b g y f s is negative in a1 2 1 2
  ..fixed exchange rate regime where the foreign country is pegging the rate case 3 ,
foreign GDP is almost always negative. In the home and foreign indexation case
 .D , the full homogeneity property implies that the real side of the foreign
economy is not affected by monetary effects. The multipliers are the same for all
exchange rate regimes and result in a fall of foreign GDP. Interestingly, in this case
DqU is independent of any of the main multipliers d , s and g which one would2 2 2
expect to determine foreign aggregate demand.
In this simple model the size of the spillover effect of home fiscal policy on
foreign GDP can be rather big. In the symmetric case DqUrD q is equal to one
 .  .  .under regime 1A , less than one in 2A ] 3A , less than one in absolute value
 .  .under B , and ambiguous and possibly even greater than one under regime C .
 .Under regime D which is most similar to existing large macro-economic models
in the long run, the GDP-spillover exactly mirrors the effect on home GDP. For
these cases one can argue that the sign of the foreign GDP response is not
appropriate and that the size is rather large in comparison with what one would
expect in reality for spillover effects. The finding is due to the strong positive
impact of the interest rate which fully compensates the impact of home GDP, g ,2
 .and the real exchange rate, yd Dl, in Eq. 1 . In the asymmetric case, the2
 .  .spillover effect can be larger than one in all the regimes of A ] C . This depends
 .mainly on the coefficients in the money demand equation, under regime A , on g2
 .and the weights in the consumption price equation a and a .1 2
Another interesting aspect is the impact of a change in some key parameters.
These are shown in Table 3 where q indicates a positive, y a negative and " an
ambiguous impact on foreign GDP. Cases where the effect is zero are neglected.
Three clear signs occur. A decrease in f increases the foreign GDP response2
since foreign money demand needs to be kept at the same level. As in general
interest rates react positively, a decrease in s increases foreign demand. An2
increase in g has a direct effect on foreign GDP.2
We conclude that the spillover effect of a fiscal shock in the home country on
foreign GDP can be rather large in size. In the asymmetric case, it can even be
 .larger than the effect on home GDP in absolute value . A remarkable fact is that
Table 3
The effect of a change in some key parameters on foreign GDP
f b u a f b d s u a g1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
UDq rDq " " " " y " " y " " q
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the coefficient g does not appear in all the spillover effects. So some spillover2
effects, measured in this way, are independent of the direct effect of home GDP on
foreign GDP. Furthermore, the case of home and foreign indexation in any of the
exchange rate regimes yields spillover responses larger than the initial domestic
response.
2.2. Monetary policy shock
In Table 4, a zero indicates the cases in which it is not possible, because of the
homogeneity condition, to obtain Dq s 1 by means of a money demand shock in
the home country. Our first observation from Table 4 is that the remaining signs
for the foreign GDP and real exchange rate responses are less ambiguous than in
the previous table. A main difference with the fiscal policy shock in Table 2 is that
interest rates now fall rather than increase, which leads to a depreciation deval-
.uation from the point of view of the home country. There is thus a shift from
foreign to home products. As the higher world interest rate depresses foreign
GDP, the ultimate spillover effect on foreign GDP is negative. This is the
well-known beggar-thy-neighbour result. This however only holds in the standard
Mundell-Fleming model with fixed wages and floating exchange rates, i.e. case
 . 11A . This negative spillover effect on foreign GDP is found if d g y d - 0. In1 2 2
all the other cases we report that the foreign GDP response is positive or zero
because of the homogeneity properties of the model. Neglecting the zero cases, the
 .2real exchange rate depreciates in all cases except for regime 3C , and the real
 .  .  .interest rate decreases if d g y d - 0 in 1A , 1B and 3B and d y d g - 01 2 2 1 2 1
 .in 3C . In this simple model the size of the spillover effect from home monetary
policy on foreign GDP can be rather big, as in the case of fiscal policy in Table 2.
 .In the symmetric case, the size equals one in 3A and is smaller than one in all
other cases. In the asymmetric case however spillover effects greater than one or
 ..smaller than minus one in 1A are possible.
The impact of a change in some key parameters is shown in Table 5 and
corresponds only to those cases where the shock had a non-zero impact on foreign
demand. Due to the fact that most entries in the first column are zero, six clear
 .cases are found. The parameters u and a appear only in regime 3C . An1 1
 .increase in u increases home prices in Eq. 1-3 in Table 1. The most important1
channel is now through the real exchange rate; an increase in home prices
appreciates the real exchange rate and thus increases foreign demand. If a1
increases, the home economy is less open, which depresses the real exchange rate
 .  .response in 3C . The parameter f only has an impact in 1A and due to the2
fixed price assumption it is negatively correlated with foreign demand. The
 .  .parameters u and a appear in 1B and 3B . They each raise the foreign price,2 2
1  .As g - 1 in McKibbin and Sachs 1991 and d s d , they report a negative effect in their Table 2-2.1 1 2
2  .  .McKibbin and Sachs 1991 report a positive effect in case 3C whereas here clearly a negative effect
is found.
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Table 4
Decomposition of foreign output after a monetary policy shock
U UDq rDq DlrDq D i rDq
Fixed wages and prices in both countries
 .  .  .  .b d g y d b 1 y g g q f g s q s f d g y d2 1 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 1 2 2 1 2 2 .1A
 .  .  .  .  .  .b d y d g q f d s q d s b d y d g q f d s q d s b d y d g q f d s q d s2 1 2 1 2 1 2 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 2 1
 .2A 0 0 0
g s q s 1 y g g2 1 2 1 2 .3A 0 y
s q g s s q g s1 1 2 1 1 2
Fixed wages and prices in the home country and foreign indexation
 . .  .  .  . .1 y a g s q s u g s q s u d g y d y 1 y a 1 y g g2 2 1 2 2 2 1 2 2 1 2 2 2 1 2 .1B
 . .  .  . .  .  . .  .s q s g 1 y a q u d s q s d s q s g 1 y a q u d s q s d s q s g 1 y s q u d s q s d1 2 1 2 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 2 1 2 1 2
 .2B 0 0 0
 . .  .  .  . .1 y a g s q s u g s q s u d g y d y 1 y a 1 y g g2 2 1 2 2 2 1 2 2 1 2 2 2 1 2 .3B
 . .  .  . .  .  . .  .s q s g 1 y a q u d s q s d s q s g 1 y a q u d s q s d s q s g 1 y a q u d s q s d1 2 1 2 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 2 1 2 1 2
Home indexation and fixed wages and prices in the foreign country
 .1C 0 0 0
 .2C 0 0 0
 .  .  .  . .  .1 y a g s q s q u d s q d s u 1 y a 1 y g g q u d y d g1 2 1 2 1 2 1 1 2 1 1 1 2 1 1 2 1 .3C y y
 . .  . .1 y a s q g s 1 y a 1 y a s q g s1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 2
Home and foreign indexation
 .1D 0 0 0
 .2D 0 0 0
 .3D 0 0 0
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Table 5
The effect of a change in some key parameters on foreign GDP
d s u a f b d s u a g1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
UDq rDq " " q q q " " " y y q
and hence boost the real exchange rate depressing foreign output. Finally, g2
appears in all non-zero entries of the first column of Table 4. It is positively
correlated with foreign demand, which conforms intuition. The monetary shock
affects home GDP and immediately feeds into the foreign GDP equation if g / 0.2
We stress again that if g ) d rd then the Mundell-Fleming beggar-thy-neighbour2 2 1
result no longer holds.
We conclude that the spillover effect of a monetary shock in the home country
on foreign GDP is zero in the case of full price homogeneity, which is a long-run
property of many empirical models. In all symmetric cases, except one where at
least one country has fixed wages and prices, the absolute size of the foreign GDP
response is smaller than the size of the home GDP response. The parameter g is2
important in the determination of the size of the shock. So monetary policy in the
home country affects foreign GDP through the direct effect of home GDP.
Comparing the two shock experiments, we conclude that the foreign demand
response can be very large and that sometimes important transmission mechanisms
 .are missing g in the case of a fiscal shock. Transmission mechanisms and the2
sign and size of spillovers in the case of a monetary shock seem to be modelled
more conform intuition.
3. Dynamic versions of the Mundell-Fleming model
The static Mundell-Fleming model in Table 1 represents a valuable starting
point for constructing more sophisticated models but, as indicated by many
authors, it makes many simplifying assumptions. For example, it lacks dynamics,
wealth effects and expectation effects. Building these features into the model
makes it more realistic but in turn more complicated and almost surely impossible
to solve analytically. So if one or more of these aspects are added to the model we
are limited to numerical illustrations.
In this section, the static model in Table 1 is extended by including certain
dynamic and expectation effects. Intertemporal and wealth effects are not yet
included but occur in the models in the next section. The model is presented in
 .3Table 6 and is similar to the one discussed by Ghosh and Masson 1994 , who
refer to the home country as the US and the foreign country as the Rest of the
3  .Slightly different versions of the model appeared in Ghosh and Masson 1991 . Other studies of
 .  .estimated small multi-country models are Papell 1989 and West 1987 .
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 .World ROW . For an extensive description of the model we refer to Ghosh and
 .Masson 1994 ; parameter values can be found in their Appendix. For our purposes
only the relevant aspects of the model are described here. Four versions of the
 .  .  .  .model are scrutinized, indicated as Model A ] D . Model A equals Model B
U  .  U .  .  .but imposes w s w s 1 in Eq. 3-3 and Eq. 3-3 . Model C equals Model B1 1
 .  U .  .but replaces Eq. 3-3 and Eq. 3-3 by a Lucas supply curve. In Model C prices
 .  U .are therefore fully flexible, instead of sluggish, see Eqs. 3-3 9 and 3-3 9. Model
 .  .D differs in two respects from Model B . First, the money demand equation is
modelled in an error correction form instead of with adjustment lags only. Second,
the GDP price level instead of the consumer price level is used to deflate money
demand.
Apart from the inclusion of dynamics in most equations, the model resembles
 .the static model in Table 1. The aggregate demand Eq. 3-2 corresponds to the
 .static version in Eq. 1-2 , except for a different term of the real short-term interest
rate, a time trend representing exogenous growth for estimation purposes and the
4  .omission of taxes. The Phillips curve in Eq. 3-3 explains GDP-prices. In Model
A, the unit coefficient for w and wU indicates that there is no long-run tradeoff1 1
between GDP-growth and inflation. This contrasts with Model B, where raising
GDP permanently produces accelerating rates of inflation. Furthermore Model C
is New Classical in that aggregate supply depends on the domestic price level
 .relative to the consumer price level. Unlike the static model, see Eq. 1-4 , there is
no wage equation. Wages are assumed to be indexed to consumer prices, i.e.
0 -s z , z -s 1 in Table 1, but influence the price level only sluggishly. Eqs.1 2
 .  .  .3-5 and 3-6 are identical to their static versions. Eq. 3-7 is the uncovered
interest rate parity condition.
As announced in the introduction we carry out a Type II fix in that the
simulations are undertaken ensuring that the response of domestic GDP is kept
constant, on a one percent level for a certain number of years. This enables us to
interpret the spillover effects over a couple of periods in an appropriate way. The
period chosen here to keep domestic GDP one percent above base level is 20 years.
As before, first a domestic fiscal shock is constructed and next a domestic
monetary shock. In addition the same experiments are performed for the foreign
country which gives, due to the asymmetry of the model, responses that do not
mirror the responses of domestic shocks.
For technical reasons a horizon of 150 years is chosen, so that simulations solve
satisfactorily for the rational expectations in the model. An exogenous variable, say
 .g, with an observation length 150 is then increased by a , a ,..., a , 0,..., 0 from1 2 20
its baseline. Subsequently, optimization tools are used to find those a , i s 1,...,ni
 .that increase domestic GDP or foreign GDP by one percent above baseline
values for the first 20 years5. Sensitivity analyses are applied to check if simulation
4  .Using the same type of aggregate demand equation, Douven and Plasmans 1996 found for several
EU economies, the US and Japan almost no empirical evidence for including taxes in such an equation.
5These analyses are carried out in MATLAB by first solving the models for the rational expectations
solutions and thereafter applying Newton algorithms.
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Table 6
Modified versions of the dynamic two-country Mundell-Fleming model
U .Model A w s w s 1 and Model B1 1
c c( )  .m y p s v q v q y v i q v m y p 3-10 1 2 3 y 1 y 1
U U U U U U U U U U Uc c( )  .m y p s v q v q y v i q v m y p 3-10 1 2 3 y 1 y 1
U( )  .q s n q n l y n i y p q p q n q q n g q n T 3-20 1 2 q 1 3 4 5
U U U U U U U U U U U U( )  .q s n q n l y n i y p q p q n q q n g q n T 3-20 1 2 q 1 3 4 5
c c( ) ( ) ( )  .p y p s w q w p y p q w q y q q w q y q 3-3ˆy 1 0 1 y 1 y 2 2 y 1 y 1 3 y 1 y 2
U U U U U U U U U U U U Uc c( ) ( ) ( )  .p y p s w q w p y p q w q y q q w q y q 3-3ˆy 1 0 1 y 1 y 2 2 y 1 y 1 3 y 1 y 2
Uc ( )( )  .p s r p q 1 y r e q p 3-51 1
U U U U Uc ( )( )  .p s r p q 1 y r ye q p 3-51 1
U  .l s e q p y p 3-6
U  .e s e q i y i 3-7q 1
Model C
c( )  .q s w q w p y p q q 3-3 9ˆ0 1
U U U U U U Uc( )  .q s w q w p y p q q 3-3 9ˆ0 1
Model D
( ) ( )  .D m y p s v q v Dq y v Di q v m y p y g y g q q g i y g T 3-1 90 1 2 3 y 1 y 1 0 1 2 3
U U U U U U U U U U U U U U U U U( ) ( )  .D m y p s v q v Dq y v Di q v m y p y g y g q q g i y g T 3-1 90 1 2 3 y 1 y 1 0 1 2 3
Notes: See Table 1. D denotes first differences; negative subscripts denote lagged values, positive
 .subscripts denote future expected values.
Definitions of endogenous variables:
q s real GDP
i s short-term interest rate
e s nominal exchange rate defined as the price in domestic currency of a unit of foreign currency
l s real exchange rate
p s price level
pc s consumer price level
Definitions of exogenous variables:
m s nominal money balances
g s real government expenditure
T s time trend
q s potential GDP.ˆ
results are stable with respect to the choices of a 150 year horizon and a 20 year
simulation period. As all four models satisfy the saddlepoint stability property see
.Blanchard and Kahn, 1980 , increasing both periods or taking different values for
the exogenous variable after year 20, instead of 0, hardly changes the results for
the first 20 years. The experiments concern:
 .v 1 A domestic fiscal shock which raises domestic GDP by one percent for 20
years;
 .v 2 A foreign fiscal shock which raises foreign GDP by one percent for 20 years;
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 .v 3 A domestic monetary shock which raises domestic GDP by one percent for 20
years;
 .v 4 A foreign monetary shock which raises foreign GDP by one percent for 20
years.
The results are graphed in Figs. 1]8. Two figures each with four panels are
 .shown for each shock. Figs. 1, 2 and 5]6 each contain i the size of the home
shock that keeps home GDP at one percent above base for 20 years, divided by n ,4
 .  .  .ii foreign GDP and its determinants, iii the real interest rate, and iv the real
exchange rate. Figs. 3,4 and 7]8 each contain the decomposition of foreign
 .domestic GDP for each of the four models. For example, a fiscal shock in the
domestic country results in a positive foreign GDP-spillover in the first years and
  .  .negative spillovers after 5 years see the solid line in Fig. 1 2 or Fig. 3 1 , where 3
 . .represents the figure number and 1 the panel number . The decomposition of
foreign GDP is
U U  U U U . U  .UD s n Dl y n D i y p q p q n D 2q 1 2 q1 3 q
 .  . U  .and graphed in Fig. 3 1 . The three dashed lines thus represent: i n Dl, ii1
U  .  . U Uyn D i y p q p , iii n Dq s n . Similar exercises are performed for the2 q1 3 3
shocks in the foreign country. If the domestic and foreign country were symmetric
in all respects, then Fig. 1 would coincide with Fig. 2, Fig. 3 with Fig. 4, etc. Further
 .  .note that the exchange rate graphs, i.e. Fig. 2 4 and Fig. 5 4 are mirrored in the
x-axis because of comparison reasons.
3.1. Fiscal policy shock
 .  .  .  .Fig. 1 1 ] 4 and Fig. 2 1 ] 4 show the results for a domestic and foreign
 .government expenditure shock, respectively. From Fig. 1 1 it follows that for the
 .  .  .  .sticky price Models A , B and D , a positive incremental shock is needed to
 .keep home GDP at one percent during 20 years. In Model C the economy jumps
 .immediately to the steady state and hence horizontal lines are shown in all sub
 .  .Fig. 1 1 ] 4 . The fiscal shock increases interest rates which leads to an apprecia-
tion of the exchange rate from the home country’s point of view. As any pressure is
fully and immediately reflected in prices, the foreign price level increases more
than the domestic price level and consequently instantaneously affects foreign
GDP negatively. For the sticky price models, on the other hand, foreign GDP in
 .  .Fig. 1 2 and Fig. 2 2 is positive in the short run but becomes negative in the
medium term. As the home GDP response is equal to one during the whole period,
 .a direct comparison with foreign GDP can be made. From Fig. 1 2 it follows that
 .  .spillovers are strongly negative in Model A and D , in particular in the long run.
Even in the first year in these models, spillovers on foreign GDP are large. As
 .expected, the real interest rate in Fig. 1 3 increases steadily and is positive almost
 .everywhere. Its response is strongest with the error-correction type Model D . The
 .foreign real exchange rate in Fig. 1 4 is negative, i.e. it appreciates, due to the
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Fig. 1. Domestic fiscal shock, fixing domestic GDP at one percent above base for 20 years.
Fig. 2. Foreign fiscal shock, fixing foreign GDP at one percent above base for 20 years.
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Fig. 3. Domestic fiscal shock, fixing domestic GDP at one percent above base for 20 years.
Fig. 4. Foreign fiscal shock, fixing foreign GDP at one percent above base for 20 years.
( )R. Dou¨en, M. Peeters r Economic Modelling 15 1998 163]195180
Fig. 5. Domestic monetary shock, fixing domestic GDP at one percent above base for 20 years.
Fig. 6. Foreign monetary shock, fixing foreign GDP at one percent above base for 20 years.
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Fig. 7. Domestic monetary shock, fixing domestic GDP at one percent above base for 20 years.
Fig. 8. Foreign monetary shock, fixing foreign GDP at one percent above base for 20 years.
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increase in the interest rate. A similar story holds for Fig. 2 and, as explained
above, Figs. 1 and 2 should be identical if symmetry holds.
Figs. 3 and 4 show the decomposition of the foreign GDP response. The solid
line represents the total foreign GDP response, the dotted line the contribution
from the real exchange rate, the dashed line the contribution from real interest
rate and the closely dotted line the contribution from the domestic GDP response.
In all four models it follows that the real interest rate is quantitatively most
important, the real exchange rate comes next and the impact of home GDP is
small. This observation can change drastically if dynamic aspects such as the
adjustment lags of foreign GDP are included in the aggregate demand equation
 .see e.g. Douven and Plasmans, 1996 .
We conclude that a fiscal policy shock that keeps home GDP at one percent
above baseline values shows a constant negative spillover effect on foreign GDP in
the neoclassical model. In all sticky price models this spillover is however positive
in the short run, negative in the medium run and for some models even very
strongly negative in the long run. All models thus show beggar-thy-neighbour-be-
haviour in both the medium and long run. This result is obtained by a combination
of three effects. The first effect is the foreign real interest rate that increases
slowly but surely to high positive values in the medium run, suppressing foreign
 .GDP. This effect overrules the second positive effect, the depreciation of the real
exchange rate which boosts exports and thus foreign GDP. The third effect, the
positive transmission in the sticky price models and the negative transmission in
.the neoclassical model of home GDP on foreign GDP, contributes only marginally.
3.2. Monetary policy shock
 .  .  .  .Fig. 5 1 ] 4 and Fig. 6 1 ] 4 show the results for a domestic and foreign money
 .  .  .demand shock, respectively. From Fig. 5 1 it follows that for Models A , B and
 .  .D a positive incremental shock is needed to keep home GDP at one percent
above base during 20 years. As the real side of the economy is not affected if prices
can adjust fully and instantaneously, a monetary shock is not possible for Model
 .C and hence it is zero in Figs. 5]8. Since a change in money is neutral in all the
models in the long run, huge incremental shocks in money demand are necessary
in order to keep home GDP deviations at the one percent level for 20 years in the
 .sticky price models. Fig. 5 1 shows that these shocks are about 20]50% deviations
from base. The only way to offset the accumulating price effects and to keep GDP
1% above base is to print even more money. The spillover effects on foreign GDP
are negative in the short run and become positive after about 2 years in all models,
 .see Fig. 5 2 . Compared to the fiscal shock experiment quantitative responses seem
more realistic. No explosive behaviour is shown as domestic GDP stays between
 .y1 and 1 for a one percent of GDP domestic shock in Fig. 5 2 . Interesting results
 .are shown in Fig. 5 3 . Foreign real interest rates fall below base in the medium
term. Only in the early years of the simulations do positive real interest rate
responses exist for some models. The reason is that foreign inflation falls more
than the negative response of the foreign nominal interest in the early years
following the shock.
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This observation corresponds with the Mundell-Fleming beggar-thy-neighbour
result as discussed in the previous section. Foreign real interest rates increase and
the real exchange rate depreciates from the point of view of the home country, see
 .Fig. 5 4 . The initial negative jump in foreign inflation peters out in the medium
term and the negative impact of the nominal interest rates becomes more impor-
tant. This has an ultimate negative impact on real interest rates. In the longer run
these results are again reversed.
 .Figs. 7 and 8 show the precise decomposition of foreign GDP. In Model A , see
 .Fig. 7 1 , the foreign real interest rate response is the main explanatory factor for
 .the foreign GDP outcome, followed by the real exchange rate. In Model B and
 .D , the foreign real interest rate and the exchange rate explain almost an equal
amount and mirror each other. Home GDP can have a substantial impact also, as
 .follows from Fig. 8 4 .
We conclude that a monetary policy shock that keeps home GDP at one percent
above baseline-values shows in the short run a negative impact on foreign GDP in
 .  .  .the sticky price models A , B and D . In the medium term foreign real interest
rates show a negative response which results in positive foreign GDP-spillovers in
most simulations. The size of the foreign GDP response is on average more
realistic than in the fiscal policy case. The foreign real interest rate tends to be the
most important component when explaining foreign GDP responses, but this result
is not as clear as in the fiscal policy case. As in the fiscal policy experiment, Models
 .  .A and D show somewhat larger responses in the domestic monetary shock
experiment. Possibly, imposing w s wU s 1 in the model of Table 6 is too1 1
restrictive. Estimating these parameters might, at least with respect to GDP-spil-
lovers, yield more realistic results.
4. Large multi-country models
 .The multi-country models discussed here are the MSG2 version 42 model of
 .McKibbin and Sachs 1991 , MULTIMOD of the IMF and NiGEM of the National
Institute, all made available to the ESRC Macroeconomic Modelling Bureau. As in
the smaller models, spillovers in these large multi-country models occur mostly
through trade, the exchange rate and interest rate mechanism. Other potentially
important international transmission mechanisms such as foreign investment, labour
force migration and knowledge spillover effects are not modelled. The models are
however detailed in other respects. They include many countries and an elaborate
set of equations per country. Moreover, they have been used by many researchers
for many different purposes; e.g. Mitchell et al., 1997 undertake a comparative
study. Simulations are performed for three types of shocks, namely a demand
shock, a supply shock and a monetary shock. The results of these simulations are
 .investigated for the US, West- Germany, France and the United Kingdom. As our
interest concerns the spillovers, the responses of GDP, the real interest rate, the
real effective exchange rate and the current account are presented in Tables 7]9.
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Performing a Type II fix during a long period can give stability problems for
some variables, hence we consider only temporary shocks, as in the previous
section. As an arbitrary choice a period of 6 years is chosen. Performing a Type II
fix is not an option in the software of the models, so a methodology was invented to
achieve the same result. A description of the methodology as well as the presenta-
tion of the shock sizes can be found in Section 6. The results presented in Tables
7]9 concern only the first five years. The reason for omitting the sixth year is that
the abrupt changes after year 6 to zero affect the simulation results in the previous
six years because of the forward looking nature of the models. This impact can also
be present during the first five years of the shock, but turns out to be negligible in
MSG2 and NiGEM.
4.1. MSG2
 .The MSG2-model is described in McKibbin and Sachs 1991 . We use version 42
which models each of the G7 countries, with the rest of the world divided into five
regions. The model is calibrated and annual. The basic model is non-linear but the
simulations are performed on a linear version of the model.
Three shocks are applied during the first six years for the US and for Germany:
v A demand shock: a government consumption shock;
v A supply shock: a value added shock;
 .v A monetary shock: a money M1 stock shock by shocking the money target.
The results are presented in Table 7.
The results for the demand shock in the US show that the GDP-spillover in
Germany is 0.14 in the first year and y0.63 in the fifth year, in the UK 0.13 and
y0.37 and in France 0.01 and y0.54. The demand shock in Germany results in
smaller spillovers in the US, being 0.01 in the first year and y0.13 in the fifth year,
but larger spillovers in the UK and France, ranging from y0.28 to 0.02 and from
y4.89 to 0.52, respectively. In a floating exchange rate regime, these effects are
mainly due to an increasing real interest rate effect in the foreign countries. This
effect overrules the positive spillovers of the current account inflow and the
depreciation of the real exchange rate. The GDP-spillovers are substantial and
 .  .qualitatively they resemble model D in Fig. 1 2 of Section 3. In the German
demand shock experiment the different monetary regime of France becomes
visible: France pegs its currency to the German mark, which drastically changes the
results. In this pegged world, the interest parity condition states that France also
has to adjust interest rates.
This results in a huge initial recession. This recession curbs inflation which in
turn provides some GDP growth in the medium run.
In comparison with this demand shock, spillovers from the supply shock are
much smaller. They range from y0.01 to 0.06 in the European countries after a
US supply shock and from 0.00 to 0.02 in the US after a German supply shock.
From Table 10 in Section 6 it follows that for fixing domestic GDP 1% above base
the supply shock is more suitable than a demand shock. For example the demand
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Table 7
 .Simulations MSG2 version 42
Year A demand shock A supply shock A monetary shock
US GE UK FR US GE UK FR US GE UK FR
US shock
GDP 1 1 0.14 0.13 0.01 1 y0.01 y0.01 y0.00 1 y0.01 y0.01 y0.00
2 1 y0.35 y0.39 y0.39 1 0.02 0.03 0.02 1 0.02 0.03 0.02
3 1 y0.62 y0.62 y0.59 1 0.05 0.05 0.04 1 0.04 0.05 0.03
4 1 y0.72 y0.67 y0.64 1 0.06 0.06 0.04 1 0.05 0.06 0.03
5 1 y0.63 y0.37 y0.54 1 0.05 0.04 0.03 1 y0.02 y0.05 y0.04
RR 1 3.66 y0.11 y0.35 0.04 0.70 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.35 0.00 0.03 y0.00
2 2.40 0.06 y0.11 0.19 y0.20 y0.01 0.01 y0.01 0.31 y0.00 0.02 y0.01
3 2.26 0.34 0.27 0.46 y0.22 y0.03 y0.02 y0.03 0.22 0.00 0.02 0.00
4 3.52 0.70 0.59 0.79 y0.28 y0.04 y0.03 y0.04 y0.16 0.02 0.09 0.03
5 6.44 1.28 1.47 1.35 y0.41 y0.07 y0.06 y0.06 y1.98 y0.07 y0.07 y0.06
RE 1 19.5 y2.15 y3.62 y2.47 y2.17 0.18 0.33 0.20 y2.24 0.13 0.30 0.15
2 16.7 y2.10 y3.20 y2.50 y1.88 0.18 0.30 0.20 y1.99 0.14 0.27 0.15
3 15.8 y2.01 y2.91 y2.48 y1.74 0.17 0.26 0.20 y1.87 0.12 0.23 0.14
4 15.6 y1.88 y2.74 y2.38 y1.63 0.16 0.23 0.18 y1.75 0.10 0.18 0.10
5 14.9 y1.70 y2.27 y2.13 y1.52 0.14 0.19 0.15 y1.34 0.03 y0.00 0.01
CA 1 y1.94 1.30 1.44 1.31 0.05 y0.07 y0.07 y0.07 y0.08 0.03 0.04 0.01
2 y1.98 0.96 1.16 1.25 0.06 y0.05 y0.05 y0.07 y0.12 0.08 0.10 0.04
3 y2.14 0.81 1.07 1.31 0.06 y0.03 y0.04 y0.07 y0.16 0.12 0.15 0.07
4 y2.44 0.79 1.13 1.47 0.07 y0.02 y0.03 y0.07 y0.18 0.15 0.18 0.08
5 y2.84 0.91 1.35 1.69 0.08 y0.02 y0.03 y0.08 y0.10 0.08 0.10 0.04
GE shock
GDP 1 0.01 1 0.02 y4.89 0.00 1 0.01 0.31 0.00 1 0.01 0.98
2 y0.15 1 y0.28 y2.35 0.02 1 0.04 0.18 0.02 1 0.06 0.89
3 y0.21 1 y0.27 y0.81 0.02 1 0.05 0.08 0.02 1 0.07 0.80
4 y0.18 1 y0.13 0.03 0.02 1 0.04 0.02 0.02 1 0.05 0.74
5 y0.13 1 0.01 0.52 0.01 1 0.02 y0.02 0.00 1 y0.01 0.64
RR 1 y0.29 3.48 y0.83 6.08 0.03 0.65 0.11 y0.28 0.04 0.26 0.18 0.19
2 0.03 2.31 0.27 4.31 0.01 y0.12 0.02 y0.25 y0.01 0.24 0.01 0.11
3 0.23 1.71 0.69 2.99 y0.01 y0.11 y0.03 y0.19 y0.04 0.24 y0.08 0.09
4 0.32 1.78 0.77 2.47 y0.02 y0.11 y0.05 y0.14 y0.08 y0.10 y0.14 0.00
5 0.37 2.66 0.84 2.86 y0.03 y0.13 y0.06 y0.13 y0.12 1.44 y0.22 0.23
RE 1 y3.85 8.58 y7.26 2.16 0.29 y1.54 0.64 0.10 0.56 y0.95 1.35 y0.62
2 y2.55 8.64 y3.62 y0.32 0.23 y1.55 0.43 0.26 0.49 y0.96 1.08 y0.50
3 y1.75 8.93 y1.95 y1.73 0.18 y1.56 0.31 0.35 0.43 y1.01 0.92 y0.42
4 y1.32 9.11 y1.30 y2.44 0.14 y1.57 0.26 0.39 0.37 y1.08 0.84 y0.36
5 y1.04 8.93 y0.91 y2.81 0.12 y1.53 0.23 0.41 0.32 y1.05 0.75 y0.34
CA 1 0.16 y3.60 0.95 0.15 y0.01 0.27 y0.06 y0.01 y0.01 0.29 y0.13 0.04
2 0.15 y3.36 0.67 0.37 y0.01 0.26 y0.04 y0.03 y0.01 0.30 y0.12 0.01
3 0.13 y3.28 0.52 0.47 y0.01 0.25 y0.03 y0.03 y0.01 0.32 y0.12 y0.00
4 0.11 y3.23 0.44 0.51 y0.01 0.24 y0.02 y0.03 y0.00 0.33 y0.11 y0.02
5 0.10 y3.06 0.38 0.49 y0.00 0.22 y0.02 y0.03 0.00 0.41 y0.13 y0.05
GDP, gross domestic product, percentage deviation from base.
RR, real short term interest rate, in percentage point deviation from base.
RE, real effective exchange rate, in percentage deviation from base.
CA, real current account, percentage point deviation from base.
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shock in Germany has to increase government expenditure by more than 5% of
GDP. Since deviations in real GDP are kept constant at 1%, the remaining
differences are almost completely absorbed by the current account which is around
y3.5% of GDP. The inflationary pressures in Germany are suppressed by high
interest rates, and as a result the German currency appreciates. All these effects
are much stronger than in the case of the German supply shock and therefore
spillovers are significantly larger.
The monetary shock in the US hardly spills over to the European countries, and
the same holds for the spillovers to the US and the United Kingdom after a
monetary shock in Germany. For both shocks the same story holds as explained for
the German supply shock. Domestic effects are modest, and therefore we only find
small real interest rate effects in the foreign countries, generating small spillovers.
The small negative response of the current account and the small appreciation of
the foreign currency after a supply shock does not seem to feed through substan-
tially to GDP. The same holds for the German monetary shock where the small
appreciation of the real effective exchange rate and the positive current account
effect in the foreign countries is too small to feed through to foreign GDP.
The spillovers of a German monetary shock to France are again high; in the first
year they almost equal the domestic GDP-response. This is due to the fact that the
Franc is pegged to the German Mark. For example, a higher German money
supply improves international competitiveness by depreciating the German cur-
rency. In Table 7, this is indicated by the negative real effective exchange rate
numbers, and since the French currency is pegged we also see negative real
effective exchange rate numbers for France.
In all regimes, after a German shock, French output is significantly larger than
in the other two countries. This reflects the finding of Helliwell and Padmore
 .  .1985 and Whitley 1992b that the type of monetary policy regime seems to be
more important for the size and sign of the spillovers than the type of shock. The
simple reason is that the foreign country which is pegging its currency has to give
an additional internal shock, normally by adjusting interest rates, which in general
enhances the internal effects.
4.2. MULTIMOD
 .MULTIMOD is described in Masson et al. 1990 and has since been updated.
The version used here includes each of the G7 countries separately and small
industrial countries and developing countries each as a block. The model is
estimated by pooled regression and is annual.
Two shocks are applied during the first 6 years for the US and Germany:
v A demand shock: a government consumption shock;
v A supply shock: a private investment shock.
 .As value added used in MSG2 again does not appear in MULTIMOD, private
investment is shocked instead. Private investment directly affects GDP so one
should be careful when comparing the outcomes with those of MSG2. A compara-
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 .ble money demand shock as in MSG2 proved difficult to implement as the money
 .demand equation in MULTIMOD like in NiGEM is dynamic, unlike in MSG2,
with a low impact multiplier, resulting in problems of instrument instability.
Results for the first two shocks are presented in Table 8.
The results for the demand shock in the US show that the GDP-spillover in
Germany is 0.15 in the first year and y0.08 in the fifth year, in the UK y0.51 and
1.18 and in France y0.18 and 0.24. The demand shock in Germany results in
smaller spillovers in the US, 0.04 in the second year to y0.01 in the fourth year,
 .but larger spillovers in absolute values in the UK and France, ranging from
y1.54 to 0.96 and y1.09 to 0.15, respectively. Whereas the magnitude of the
 .demand and supply shocks differ see Table 11, Section 6 the outcomes in Table 8
for both shocks are strikingly similar. So, concerning GDP spillovers it does not
make much difference in MULTIMOD if government consumption or private
investment is shocked. The MULTIMOD results differ in some respects from the
MSG2 demand shock results. MULTIMOD clearly shows more asymmetries
between the US and Germany. A German demand shock yields very small, positive
spillovers for the US economy whereas a US demand shock produces negative
spillovers for European economies. The main difference is that the real short-term
interest rate of the country generating the shock is negative the first two years after
the shock. This indicates that nominal interest rate adjustments in response to
price increases are slower in MULTIMOD than in MSG2. This difference is
reflected in the dynamics of the money demand equations which ensure that
interest rates in MULTIMOD adjust more slowly to suppress inflation than in
  ..MSG2 see also Mitchell et al. 1997 . This inflation is passed through to foreign
countries which yields smaller negative GDP-spillovers for Germany in the medium
term than in MSG2. This inflation effect, which in turn raises interest rates in
foreign countries, is stronger than the impact on foreign GDP obtained by the
expected positive effect of the depreciation of the real effective exchange rate.
There are also differences in the size of GDP-spillovers across countries. This is
especially true for the UK and France. Both countries are modelled as ERM
members, pegging German rates, which yields rather strong GDP-spillovers. This,
again, stresses the fact that in floating regimes GDP-spillovers seem to be modest
but in the case of pegged exchange rate regimes GDP-spillovers can be even
stronger than the GDP-response in the country where the shock originates.
4.3. NiGEM
 .The NiGEM model is described in NIGEM 1996 . The version used here is May
1996 which includes each of the G7 countries, in slightly less detail Spain, The
 .Netherlands, Belgium and the rest of the world in several blocks . In contrast to
MSG2, the model is estimated and is quarterly. The results presented are the
averages of the four quarters for each year.
Two shocks are implemented during the first 6 years for both the US and
Germany:
( )R. Dou¨en, M. Peeters r Economic Modelling 15 1998 163]195188
Table 8
 .Simulations MULTIMOD MARK II
Year A demand shock A supply shock
US GE UK FR US GE UK FR
US shock
GDP 1 1 0.15 y0.51 y0.18 1 0.14 y0.51 y0.19
2 1 y0.16 y0.73 y0.31 1 y0.15 y0.71 y0.30
3 1 y0.14 y0.25 y0.20 1 y0.17 y0.26 y0.22
4 1 y0.07 0.41 y0.03 1 y0.13 0.36 y0.07
5 1 y0.08 1.18 0.24 1 0.01 1.09 0.17
RR 1 y2.03 y0.29 1.40 0.16 y1.89 y0.29 1.38 0.16
2 y1.48 0.01 1.18 0.39 y1.39 0.01 1.18 0.39
3 0.67 0.75 1.55 0.84 0.05 0.71 1.51 0.82
4 4.54 1.88 2.20 1.21 0.04 1.74 2.09 0.15
5 10.41 3.71 2.76 2.10 0.09 3.34 2.49 1.91
RE 1 7.99 y1.41 y2.09 y1.26 7.92 y1.41 y2.08 y1.27
2 9.85 y1.53 y3.53 y1.63 9.65 y1.52 y3.49 y1.61
3 11.9 y1.71 y4.71 y1.96 11.64 y1.68 y4.65 y1.94
4 12.7 y1.82 y5.21 y2.05 12.45 y1.79 y5.18 y2.05
5 11.0 y1.45 y5.20 y1.43 11.12 y1.50 y5.26 y1.52
CA 1 y0.18 y0.06 0.13 y0.01 y0.18 y0.06 0.13 y0.01
2 y0.96 0.38 y0.08 0.03 y0.93 0.37 y0.07 0.03
3 y1.31 0.72 0.14 0.04 y1.28 0.70 0.14 0.04
4 y1.71 1.10 0.34 0.08 y1.67 1.06 0.33 0.08
5 y2.08 1.28 0.27 0.13 y2.05 1.25 0.25 0.13
GE shock
GDP 1 0.02 1 y0.85 y0.50 0.02 1 y0.79 y0.46
2 0.04 1 y1.54 y1.09 0.04 1 y1.43 1.00
3 0.03 1 y0.99 y0.90 0.02 1 y0.90 y0.84
4 y0.01 1 y0.11 y0.51 y0.03 1 y0.09 y0.51
5 0.00 1 0.96 0.15 y0.03 1 0.89 0.07
RR 1 0.05 y0.40 2.78 1.55 0.05 y0.30 2.67 1.45
2 0.20 y0.37 2.66 1.91 0.19 y0.26 2.52 1.78
3 0.38 0.15 2.41 2.13 0.36 0.16 2.23 1.93
4 0.55 1.68 2.46 2.15 0.50 1.36 2.22 1.87
5 0.71 3.94 1.62 1.78 0.62 3.13 1.36 1.48
RE 1 y2.60 2.62 0.75 0.65 y2.44 2.44 0.70 0.61
2 y2.21 4.39 y0.84 0.21 y2.05 4.03 y0.82 0.23
3 y1.78 6.33 y2.32 y0.38 y1.63 5.75 y2.22 y0.30
4 y1.38 7.83 y3.51 y1.00 y1.27 7.08 y3.33 y0.85
5 y0.73 8.06 y4.44 y1.34 y0.72 7.41 y4.23 y1.16
CA 1 y0.02 y0.82 0.41 0.08 y0.02 y0.78 0.39 0.04
2 0.14 y1.58 0.14 0.09 0.14 y1.47 0.13 0.15
3 0.22 y1.94 y0.22 0.10 0.21 y1.80 y0.22 0.11
4 0.23 y1.97 y0.45 0.09 0.21 y1.82 y0.45 0.07
5 0.23 y1.90 y0.55 0.08 0.06 y1.79 y0.99 0.06
GDP, gross domestic product, percentage deviation from base.
RR, real short term interest rate, in percentage point deviation from base.
RE, real effective exchange rate, in percentage deviation from base.
CA, real current account, percentage point deviation from base.
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v A demand shock: a government consumption shock;
v A supply shock: a business investment shock.
 .As value added used in MSG2 does not appear in NiGEM business investment
is shocked instead. Business investment directly affects GDP, allowing comparison
with MULTIMOD. The money demand shock again proved impossible to imple-
ment for the same reasons as with MULTIMOD. The results for the demand and
supply shocks are presented in Table 9.
The results for the demand shock in the US show that the GDP-spillovers in
Germany, the UK and France are positive. The GDP-spillovers are strongest in
Germany. A demand shock in Germany generates negative spillovers, except for
the first year in the US. As in MULTIMOD, spillovers from the supply shock are
qualitatively similar to the demand shock. Although Germany, the UK and France
are modelled in an ERM, the size of GDP-spillovers are always within range and
 .do not show any extreme outliers as was the case in MSG2 and MULTIMOD .
The mechanisms at work seem to be largely the same as the ones described in
the previous sections. In case of a fiscal shock or supply shock, the nominal interest
rate increases. As inflation is higher than the interest rate increase, the real
interest rate can decrease in the short run. After a US fiscal shock the US real
interest rate decreases by 0.98%-point, but after a German fiscal shock this rate in
Germany increases by 0.23%-point. The dollar appreciates much more after the
US-shock than the German Mark after the German shock, and the spillovers to
 .Germany are much higher see upper part of Table 9 than the spillovers to the US
 .see lower part of Table 9 . After the fiscal shock the US current balance
deteriorates. But again, this deterioration is less than the decrease in the current
balance of Germany after the German shock.
The results are similar for MULTIMOD that show a y0.19%-point decrease for
the US and a y0.82%-point decrease for Germany. The NiGEM-results differ in
some respects from the MSG2-results. First, NiGEM clearly shows asymmetries
between the US and Germany. For both shocks, the GDP-spillovers in Germany
have the opposite sign to the GDP-spillovers in the US. Spillovers in Germany are
also much stronger than the spillovers in the US. Secondly, spillovers due to the
supply shock in NiGEM are close to those due to the demand shock, whereas in
MSG2 spillovers are smaller. This difference might be due to the fact that in
MSG2 the supply side is modelled in more detail, whereas in NiGEM it is not. The
NiGEM-results resemble the MULTIMOD in that the demand and supply shocks
are similar in signs and sizes. Again, this is due to the fact that the government
expenditure shock as well as a business investment shock instantaneously affects
GDP. It would have been preferable to perform a value added shock, as carried out
 .in MSG2, but this is unfortunately not possible as the supply side is not modelled
in great detail. A major difference between NiGEM and MULTIMOD is that
 .spillovers from the USA to Germany and UK and France are locomotive in the
former whereas they become negative after the first year in the latter. The
appreciation of the dollar is stronger in MULTIMOD, but the trade-advantage for
Germany, France and the UK is longer lasting in NiGEM. This is probably due to
the stronger dynamics in NiGEM.
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Table 9
 .Simulations NiGEM May 1996
Year A demand shock A supply shock
US GE UK FR US GE UK FR
US shock
GDP 1 1 0.18 0.10 0.08 1 0.20 0.12 0.09
2 1 0.22 0.10 0.12 1 0.22 0.11 0.12
3 1 0.24 0.11 0.14 1 0.22 0.09 0.13
4 1 0.28 0.11 0.17 1 0.23 0.07 0.14
5 1 0.32 0.13 0.20 1 0.25 0.06 0.15
RR 1 y0.98 0.01 y0.03 y0.03 y0.89 0.01 y0.03 y0.05
2 y0.76 0.00 y0.02 y0.02 y0.67 y0.00 y0.03 y0.02
3 y0.44 y0.01 y0.02 y0.02 y0.35 y0.02 y0.03 y0.03
4 y0.16 y0.02 y0.02 y0.02 y0.06 y0.03 y0.03 y0.03
5 y0.01 y0.03 y0.02 y0.02 0.10 y0.03 y0.03 y0.03
RE 1 1.24 y0.17 y0.2 y0.11 1.70 y0.24 y0.29 y0.15
2 1.69 y0.23 y0.27 y0.14 2.08 y0.28 y0.34 y0.18
3 1.49 y0.18 y0.24 y0.12 1.79 y0.22 y0.29 y0.14
4 1.12 y0.10 y0.18 y0.08 1.34 y0.13 y0.22 y0.09
5 0.68 y0.01 y0.12 y0.02 0.85 y0.04 y0.15 y0.03
CA 1 y0.19 0.04 0.09 0.06 y0.17 0.04 0.09 0.07
2 y0.22 0.06 0.12 0.08 y0.21 0.06 0.13 0.09
3 y0.25 0.08 0.14 0.10 y0.24 0.08 0.15 0.11
4 y0.28 0.09 0.16 0.11 y0.28 0.09 0.17 0.12
5 y0.31 0.11 0.17 0.13 y0.31 0.11 0.19 0.14
GE shock
GDP 1 0.01 1 y0.10 y0.03 0.00 1 y0.16 y0.07
2 y0.03 1 y0.28 y0.08 y0.07 1 y0.43 y0.17
3 y0.05 1 y0.36 y0.08 y0.11 1 y0.59 y0.21
4 y0.06 1 y0.38 y0.04 y0.14 1 y0.66 y0.2
5 y0.06 1 y0.32 0.04 y0.16 1 y0.65 y0.14
RR 1 y0.12 0.23 0.30 0.31 0.25 0.03 0.35 y0.03
2 y0.11 0.12 0.32 0.29 0.14 0.37 0.32 y0.01
3 y0.09 0.05 0.35 0.30 0.07 0.40 0.34 0.00
4 y0.07 0.00 0.37 0.32 0.01 0.44 0.36 0.02
5 y0.07 y0.03 0.40 0.34 y0.02 0.47 0.39 0.02
RE 1 y0.46 0.19 0.27 0.15 y0.72 0.32 0.43 0.23
2 y0.32 0.32 0.10 0.05 y0.57 0.45 0.22 0.11
3 y0.15 0.68 y0.16 y0.11 y0.36 0.83 y0.12 y0.08
4 0.05 1.11 y0.49 y0.29 y0.10 1.29 y0.54 y0.30
5 0.25 1.51 y0.83 y0.45 0.15 1.73 y0.98 y0.52
CA 1 y0.01 y0.39 0.10 0.04 y0.03 y0.41 0.11 0.03
2 y0.00 0.44 0.13 0.05 y0.01 y0.49 0.14 0.05
3 0.01 y0.49 0.15 0.07 0.00 y0.54 0.17 0.06
4 0.02 y0.52 0.18 0.07 0.02 y0.58 0.20 0.07
5 0.02 y0.55 0.20 0.08 0.02 y0.62 0.24 0.08
GDP, gross domestic product, percentage deviation from base.
RR, real short term interest rate, in percentage point deviation from base.
RE, real effective exchange rate, in percentage deviation from base.
CA, real current account, percentage point deviation from base.
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5. Conclusions
In global economic modelling there is a growing interest in ‘spillovers’, defined
as the disturbances in foreign countries that result from policy actions in a home
country. The theoretical Mundell-Fleming model with sticky wages and prices
provides the foundation of most empirical models, and its predictions are well
known: fiscal policy tends to be ‘locomotive’, with positive spillovers, whereas
monetary policy is ‘beggar-thy-neighbour’, with negative spillovers. However stud-
ies of empirical dynamic models show wide variation in the sign and sizes of
spillovers. A particular difficulty is that a precise way to measure spillovers over
more than one period has never been given.
In this paper a new measure for determining GDP-spillovers is proposed. This
measure is the response of foreign GDP when GDP of the country in which the
shock originates is fixed at a 1% level above base for a certain number of years. It
is calculated using a diagnostic Type II fix. The advantage of the proposed spillover
measure is that specific variables of interest can be compared precisely over a
longer simulation period.
Simulations are performed on small static models, small dynamic models and
three large-scale calibrated or estimated models: MSG2,MULTIMOD and NiGEM.
In the small Mundell-Fleming type models under floating exchange rates, fiscal
policy yields a positive GDP-spillover in the first year but increasingly negative
spillovers in subsequent years. These results are confirmed by MSG2 and MULTI-
MOD. In general it was found that in the empirical models under floating
exchange rates GDP spillovers tend to be small, whereas under pegged exchange
rates GDP spillovers can sometimes be huge. Under pegged exchange rates these
spillovers sometimes exceed in size the GDP response of the country where the
shock originates.
In the theoretical models under floating exchange rates monetary policy, ef-
fected by changing the money base, yields a negative GDP-spillover in the first year
but positive spillovers in subsequent years, eventually returning to base. These
results are confirmed by the calibrated MSG2 model, although the responses are
weak. Attempts to carry out a similar experiment on the two estimated models,
MULTIMOD and NIGEM, ran into difficulties, since the monetary base is not an
effective instrument to keep GDP at a certain percentage above base during more
than one period in these models.
In general, in all types of models the foreign real interest rate is found to
represent an important transmission mechanism; the contribution to GDP-spil-
lovers arising from trade effects is found to be small. In empirical models it was
found that under floating exchange rates spillovers are much smaller than under
 .pegged exchange rates. These results confirm the analysis of Roubini 1991 , using
an older version of the MSG model, that structural spillover effects are small and
that most spillover effects are rather policy-induced. For example, strong policy
induced spillover occur if the foreign country follows a policy to peg parities with
the country where the shock originates. We also found some indication that under
 .floating exchange rate regimes spillovers in small dynamic models tend to be
larger than in large empirical models.
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To summarize, the overall results confirm economic intuition that spillovers are
non-negligible and throw a different light on existing studies with multi-country
models that show only tiny spillovers.
6. Construction of Type II fixes
The MULTIMOD-Type-II-fixes have been carried out by optimal control, i.e. an
additional equation is added to the model by which GDP-deviations from a one
percent deviation from base of GDP are punished. This is easy to perform with
MULTIMOD. For MSG2 and NiGEM carrying out a Type II fix is more cumber-
some as these models run in their own software and for this reason are carried out
as follows.
To perform a Type II fix for n periods, first a shock is applied for each of the n
periods. The partial derivative is then calculated by which the size of the shock
needed for the Type II fix can be determined. To give an example, assume n s 2,
and a shock g with response y. Shocking g by a in the first period gives a certain1
response in y, say b in the first period and b in second period, and subse-11 12
quently shocking g in the second period by a gives b and b in the first and2 21 22
second period. This can be formalized as
 .  .a 0 g ª b b y ,1 11 12  .3 .  .0 a g ª b b y ,2 21 22
where g and y are two-dimensional vectors. From this follows
y1
b b a 011 12 1  .g ª y. 4 /  /b b 0 a21 22 2
The shock size ensuring a one percent increase in y then is
 .  .a b y b a b y b1 22 21 2 11 12  .and 5U U U Ub b y b b b b y b b11 22 12 21 11 22 12 21
in the first and second period, respectively.
If there is no forward looking behaviour, b s 0. If a temporary shock only has21
 .a temporary instantaneous effect, also b s 0. In the case where b s b s 0,12 21 12
the shock size for a one percent Type II fix is thus a rb in the first period and1 11
a rb in the second period. However, in the case of forward looking behaviour or2 22
responses that last longer than only the current period the calculation of the shock
is evidently more complicated; it is no longer possible to divide merely the vector
 .on the left hand side of the arrow in Eq. 4 by the vector on the right hand side of
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this arrow6. This shows that obtaining a Type II fix is not a straightforward
procedure in models with rational expectations andror dynamic specifications.
This also shows that the comparison of GDP responses of two countries, say
country A and B, is not merely possible by a division of the GDP-responses of
country A by those of country B. A one percent increase in GDP as a deviation
from base is constructed in our analysis, and hence can be directly compared across
countries.
Our objective is a 6 years Type II fix in GDP. Thus first six shocks are performed
in MSG2, and then the size of the shock that gives a one percent increase in GDP
during the first 6 years is calculated. As MSG2 is linearized and behaves well, no
problems were encountered when carrying out this exercise. NiGEM is a quarterly
model, so 24 shocks need to be performed to achieve the objective. For the
government consumption and business investment shock no problems arose. For
the money demand shock, on the other hand, some insurmountable problems
occurred. First, the equation is dynamic by which a one percent increase in the first
year is not achievable. Second, the money multiplier turns out to be very small for
the US as well as for Germany. So very large shocks are necessary to obtain a one
percent increase in GDP. This seems to lead to stability problems, in particular for
  ..Germany see also Turner et al. 1989 .
Tables 10]12 report the sizes of the exogenous shock performed in Tables 7]9,
respectively.
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Table 10
 .The shocks in MSG2 as percentage of GDP resulting in 1% increase in GDP during 6 years
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year 6 Years 7]50
US
A demand shock 5.39 5.37 5.68 6.17 6.59 7.06 0
A supply shock 1.00 0.64 0.68 0.70 0.72 0.69 0
A monetary shock 0.94 1.95 3.52 5.74 9.25 21.3 0
Germany
A demand shock 5.69 5.33 5.24 5.26 5.20 4.67 0
A supply shock 1.01 0.66 0.70 0.74 0.75 0.84 0
A monetary shock 1.01 1.94 3.24 5.00 6.23 21.4 0
6 This would only be possible if the division is by the same amount in each period.
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Table 11
 .The shocks in MULTIMOD as a percentage of GDP resulting in a 1% increase in GDP during 6 years
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Years 6]50
US
A demand shock 13.57 25.55 40.10 52.37 59.79 0
A supply shock 11.21 22.31 28.96 32.96 34.33 0
Germany
A demand shock 17.38 32.37 42.07 50.12 53.79 0
A supply shock 5.02 7.46 10.18 11.93 12.21 0
Table 12
 .The shocks in NiGEM as a percentage of GDP resulting in a 1% increase in GDP during six years
Quarter US GE
Demand Supply Demand Supply
1.1 6.39 10.03 15.23 5.45
1.2 7.35 11.42 16.14 6.23
1.3 8.26 12.53 16.67 6.94
1.4 9.45 13.86 17.68 7.76
2.1 10.69 14.88 18.66 8.62
2.2 11.57 15.59 19.46 9.48
2.3 12.39 16.13 19.80 10.22
2.4 13.19 16.58 19.96 10.89
3.1 13.93 16.88 20.25 11.57
3.2 14.61 17.02 20.55 12.25
3.3 15.33 17.16 20.82 12.94
3.4 15.96 17.18 20.96 13.56
4.1 16.58 17.08 21.30 14.21
4.2 17.15 16.93 21.49 14.79
4.3 17.73 16.83 21.92 15.42
4.4 18.24 16.58 22.21 15.98
5.1 18.73 16.38 22.62 16.60
5.2 19.26 16.16 23.04 17.20
5.3 19.70 15.91 23.43 17.80
5.4 20.09 15.62 23.86 18.38
6.1 20.50 15.35 24.37 19.00
6.2 20.90 15.12 24.79 19.55
6.3 21.26 14.87 25.27 20.14
6.4 21.70 14.70 25.61 20.66
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